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we identify these two distinctly by examining different proxies for them. We use income stream 
uncertainty and accounting beta to proxy firm-risk, and market risk and capital intensity ratio represent 
managerial risk-taking. Once defined, our objective is to find the antecedents of both these by using the 
most advanced structural equation modelling (SEM) approach from created constructs of performance, 
psychological, corporate governance, shareholding patterns, fundamental valuation and firm’s 
characteristics drivers. We formulate seven hypotheses based on empirical literature representing these 
constructs. We use data of 269 Indian firms for 18 (1999-2017) years to run SEM and then analyse our 
results individually and combinedly. SEM is used here to test the unidimensionality of the seven 
constructs (consisting of 19 drivers) and to analyze these drivers (i.e. antecedents) influence on firm-risk 
and managerial risk-taking i.e. firm’s risk-play. Results prove that present firm-performance, corporate 
governance drivers, promoters’ shareholding and firm’s characteristics are driving firm’s risk-play. 
However, fundamental valuation drivers have no role to play in influencing income stream uncertainty, 
systematic operating risks and managerial risk-attitudes. Psychological drivers and foreign shareholdings 
act only as a catalyst of firm-risk. 
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Understanding risk from managerial risk-taking (problematic and innovative searches) and 
firm-risk (i.e. income stream uncertainty) contexts is an important strategic management and 
finance issue during last three decades. Empirical literature examines the concept of risk-taking 
from economic (see Karni and Safra, 1987; and Machina, 1989) [i.e. how much (variability of 
income)]; decision theoretic (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; and Keeney and Raiffa, 1976) 
[i.e. who takes and when (Figner et al., 2009; Weber et al., 2002)]; and psychological (see 
Kogan and Wallach, 1964; Tversky et al., 1988; etc.) [i.e. the extent to which the decision is 
emotionally charged (Figner et al., 2009; Loewenstein et al., 2001)]; etc. perspectives across 
the world. However, most of the earlier studies have used firm-risk to proxy for managerial 
risk-taking based on the assumption that such managerial actions cause variations in firm 
performance. While determinants and consequences of firm-risk is recently examined in the 
US and other developed markets worldwide (see e.g., Bargeron et al., 2010; Faccio et al., 2011; 
John et al., 2008; Li et al., 2013; etc.), little attention has been paid to these issues in emerging 
markets. Scholarly research in strategy, finance and other organisation disciplines is generally 
focused on identifying factors that explain firm performance without serious consideration of 
drivers (i.e. antecedents) of firm-risk and managerial risk-taking (i.e. firm’s risk-play) except 
in relation to systematic risk. 
 
Few past empirical studies document individual organisational and industrial drivers of firm- 
risk in relation to firm fundamentals (see Jensen et al., 1992; La Porta et al., 2000; Lu et al., 
2019; etc.); firm performance (see Fisher and Hall; 1969; Massini et al., 2005; DasGupta and 
Deb, 2020; etc.); and corporate governance (see Fama and Jensen, 1983; Brick and 
Chidambaran, 2008; Bhagat et al., 2015; etc.), but, mostly in developed market contexts. 
Therefore, empirical literature is mostly silent about the drivers (i.e. antecedents) of firm-risk 
and managerial risk-taking in terms of problematic or innovative searches by firms and their 
managers. Only a few studies like Xiadong et al. (2014) tries to investigate its determinants 
from theoretical application viewpoint. We fill these research gaps in the existing literature by 
investigating the influence of firm’s performance, psychological factors, ownership patterns, 
corporate governance, institutional characteristics, and valuation factors as antecedents of firm- 
risk and managerial risk-taking in a single model using the most advanced structural equation 
modelling (SEM) approach in an emerging market context i.e. India. Our results would also 
find out whether the same drivers are influencing both firm-risk and managerial risk-taking 
behaviour, and if so which are these antecedents. 
 
Accordingly, our main motivation of this study is to find out which of the studied antecedents 
among performance, psychological, corporate governance, shareholding patterns, fundamental 
valuation, and firm’s characteristics drivers influence both firm-risk and managerial risk-taking 
in the emerging market context of India. As a secondary motivation, we would validate whether 
income stream uncertainty and accounting beta proxying firm-risk, and capital intensity ratio 
and market risk representing managerial risk-taking provide identical findings in the context of 
antecedents driving firm’s overall risk-play. 
 
To fulfil our objectives, we begin by providing working definitions of risk, firm-risk and 
managerial risk-taking to show their distinctiveness to be studied here. These definitions would 
also allow us to outline how managers’ risk-taking influences firm-risk as is generally 
perceived by external stakeholders including the shareholders. Thereby, it is extremely critical 
to draw a distinction between how managers perceive risk (i.e. managerial risk-taking) and how 
external stakeholders measure risk (i.e. firm-risk), as these two have most often been confused 
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and used interchangeably. Finally, we presume that despite differences between managerial 
risk-taking and firm-risk, the former has a significant influence on the latter. 
 
Strategy and finance literature define risk in two different ways. For some authors (e.g. 
Feigenbaum and Thomas, 1988), it represents the degree of uncertainty and is thereby 
measured as variability in income. This definition corresponds to notion of ‘firm-risk’, i.e. say 
managers do problematic searches, as generally being held by investors/shareholders who wish 
to price future income streams. A critical influence on the pricing of a firm’s future income 
(i.e. through profitability measures and stock prices) is the uncertainty of that income. Firms 
which report returns varying disproportionately (i.e. volatile or downside firms) relative to its 
own past returns or overall market’s returns are of higher risk. Therefore, here we take both 
income stream uncertainty and accounting beta to proxy firm-risk. This would cater not only 
the firm’s-, but industry-heterogeneity -based performance volatility also (see Fiegenbaum, 
1990; Lehner, 2000; Miller and Bromiley, 1991; etc.). 
 
Therefore, in such an organisational context, ‘managerial risk-taking’ refers to choosing the 
strategies or investment opportunities with higher income variability within the wider range of 
possible alternatives (i.e. innovative searches) to maximise bottom line. However, Shapira 
(1995), Miller and Leiblein (1996), etc. argue that firm managers view risk more in terms of 
downside losses (i.e. problematic searches). So, they are more likely to focus on potential losses 
from an investment alternative, i.e., actions that increase firm’s exposure to losses are thereby 
risky. Therefore, according to us, ‘managerial risk-taking’ seeks to reduce firm-risk by limiting 
downside exposure even if this sacrifices upside potential in the strategic or investment decision 
making process. That is why many prior studies inaccurately use firm-risk to proxy managerial 
risk-taking because they assume that managerial risk-taking would modify firm’s performance 
(Palmer and Wiseman, 1999). All these motivate us to examine both firm-risk and managerial 
risk-taking (i.e. firm’s risk-play, as we put it here) distinctively with different set of proxies 
here. 
 
Generally, managers make strategic choices among available alternative investment 
opportunities, e.g., capital investment in new projects, research and development expenditures, 
etc., i.e., in nature of problematic and/or innovative searches, on behalf of the firm, having 
different risk-return characteristics. Then, one combines the risk-return characteristics of the 
selected investments to create a portfolio of risk and return that reflects firm’s overall risk-play 
in the form of variability of income streams and market returns which investors/shareholders 
look at. Therefore, in this study we also use capital intensity ratio and market risk to proxy 
managerial risk-taking in the firm context. 
 
We contribute to the literature in two ways. Firstly, we frame two different risk measures, i.e., 
firm-risk and managerial risk-taking (i.e. firm’s risk-play) under one model to examine and 
find out the most influential drivers of them in an emerging market context which has never 
done before. Under each of these measures, we have also taken two dependent variables each 
of distinct nature to make our study more robust. Study results prove that present firm- 
performance, corporate governance, promoter’s shareholding and firm’s characteristics are 
driving both firm-risk and managerial risk-taking simultaneously. However, fundamental 
valuation drivers have no role to play in influencing income-variability, systematic operating 
risks and managerial risk-attitudes. Psychological drivers and foreign shareholdings act only 
as a catalyst of firm-risk. Secondly, we use the most advanced SEM approach for the first time 
in literature to find out common antecedents for Indian firms which influence both firm-risk 
and managerial risk-taking simultaneously. The SEM is a second-generation multivariate 
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method that is used to assess the reliability and validity of the model measures by the CFA 
(confirmatory factor analysis), and thereby much more superior to other regression methods. 
Therefore, here we eliminate the weaknesses of the limited earlier studies with methodological 
concerns. 
 
Literature review and hypotheses development: 
 
Performance drivers and firm’s risk-play: 
 
Classical finance theory and empirical literature pre-Bowman (1980) (such as Fisher and Hall, 
1969; and Hurdle, 1974) point out a significant positive association between firm’s risk and 
return. Fisher and Hall (1969) in their seminal paper first present an economic argument of 
firm-performance’s impact on risk-taking - “this implies that earnings should be larger, on the 
average, for firms with greater variation in their earnings than for firms with little earnings 
variability” (p.82). However, Bowman (1980) for the first time prove a negative risk-return 
association for poor performers. The direct impact of firm-performance on firm-risk and 
managerial risk-taking is central to work of Bowman (1980; 1984) and Fiegenbaum and 
Thomas (1985; 1988) and is also significant in Singh’s (1986) research. However, most of these 
studies see the impact of performance on firm-risk and managerial risk-taking from a troubled 
firm context and not on an overall top-down basis. In addition, income stream uncertainty is 
mostly been studied either taking the return on assets (ROA) or return on equity (ROE) 
measures. To fill these gaps in the existing literature, here we take actual firm- performance, 
actual market-return performance of firms and also the cash performance to examine the impact 
of performance as a whole on firm-risk and managerial risk-taking (i.e. firm’s risk-play) (see 
table 1). 
 
Therefore, our first hypothesis is: 
 
H1: Performance drivers influence firm’s risk-play. 
 
Psychological drivers and firm’s risk-play: 
 
Firm’s managers take decisions based on two different measures - performance level they 
aspire to (aspirations) and performance level they expect (expectations). This implies that the 
amount of risk managers would accept depend on the expected performance in relation to 
aspiration. When expected performance is higher than aspiration, managers are contended 
about firm’s performance, so they need no change. However, if manager has his expected 
performance level fall below aspiration level, a major organizational change is initiated to fix 
policies, procedures and techniques that would increase firm-performance (see behavioural 
theory of Cyert and March, 1963; and March and Shapira, 1987). Kahneman and Tversky’s 
(1979) prospect theory puts that level of a firm’s aspiration serves as a target or reference level, 
firms that anticipate returns below that level would be risk-taking and those that anticipate 
returns above it would be risk-avoiding. 
 
This aspiration-expectancy gap for below performing firms would induce them to undertake 
risky decisions (problematic searches) in capex front, which in turn would reduce firm 
predictability and create income stream uncertainty and investors’ suspicions. Lant and 
Montgomery (1987) also find that performance below aspirations resulted in riskier choices 
and more innovative searches than performance that met or exceeds aspirations. Although all 
earlier studies use only actual performance to predict risk, we follow the behavioural theory 
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(Cyert and March, 1963) of the firm and use expected performance along with actual 
performance here. It allows us to differentiate between direct effects of performance on firm- 
risk and managerial risk-taking and psychological impact of aspiration-expectation process on 
these. 
 
As both aspiration and expectation are manager and firm-centric reference or target points we 
also incorporate an industry performance psychological driver (see table 1) in line with earlier 
empirical studies (Fiegenbaum, 1990; Lehner, 2000; and Miller and Bromiley, 1991) which 
adopt industry mean or median as the reference point. This is also used here as a complementary 
measure of firm’s actual performance impact on firm-risk and managerial risk- taking (i.e. firm’s 
risk-play). Therefore, our second hypothesis is: 
 
H2: Psychological drivers (aspiration-expectancy gap in terms of firm’s actual performance, 
market performance and industry-adjusted performance) influence firm’s risk-play. 
 
Corporate governance drivers and firm’s risk-play: 
 
Although there is no optimal board-size for heterogeneous firms in a country context, size of 
the board affects firm’s policy choices, and thereby firm’s risk-play and firm-value (see Coles 
et al., 2008; and Guest, 2009). The standard argument is that larger the board less effective it 
is at monitoring management (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Jensen, 1993). However, we find 
mixed empirical evidence (Aebi et al., 2012). Several studies observe that we need larger 
boards in large organisations to reflect complexities of their business models, to increase pool 
of expertise and resources available, and to increase the potential of establishing contacts with 
diverse customers and depositors (Dalton et al., 1999). Extending this idea, Cheng (2008) 
shows that US firms with larger boards are associated with lower performance volatility. Wang 
(2012) further documents that board size has a negative impact on investment decisions (i.e. 
managerial risk-taking), as well as subsequent firm-risk. 
 
Board’s diversity is also associated with better firm performance, quality of earnings and/or 
lower risk-taking propensity by managers. There are several theoretical motives (see Fama, 
1983; and Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008) as to why greater independence of directors 
may be beneficial to effectiveness of the board. One of the most influential arguments 
emphasises the role of incentives that independent directors have to protect their reputation (see 
Fama, 1980) in the market for independent directorships. This would encourage them to restrict 
firms and its managers to take innovative searches and thereby lower firm-risk and managerial 
risk-taking (i.e., firm’s risk-play) (Aebi et al., 2012; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Pathan, 2009). 
Therefore, our third hypothesis is: 
 
H3: Corporate governance drivers influence firm’s risk-play. 
 
Shareholding pattern drivers and firm’s risk-play: 
 
Although, large body of literature documents that agency conflicts resulting from a separation 
between ownership and control do indeed affect firm-decisions (e.g., firm restructuring, 
divestment and mergers), one issue that remains largely unexplored is the impact of 
shareholders’ identity/pattern on firm’s risk-taking, as the latter being a fundamental driver of 
firm-performance and growth (Bromiley, 1991; John et al., 2008). Here, we seek to identify 
whether ownership pattern has a significant and sizable impact on earnings volatility as well as 
its normal effect on firm-outcomes through strategic decisions, i.e., managerial risk-taking. 
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Prior research only focuses on institutional drivers of firm’s risk-taking (John et al., 2008; 
Acharya et al., 2011; Li et al., 2013) or on the link between risk-taking and shareholder 
diversification/concentration (Faccio et al., 2011) for publicly traded firms. However, we adopt 
an alternative perspective and examine the impact of promoters and foreign owners and non- 
promoter foreign shareholdings on firm-risk and managerial risk-taking behaviour. We argue 
that foreign owners who are holding largest block either in promoter capacity or as FIIs in 
Indian firms are more likely to undertake capital budgeting decisions (so capital intensity ratio 
would also be high) that would increase earnings volatility (i.e., riskier projects). Foreign 
owners/investors seek to improve firm’s operating performance might also implement 
innovative searches such as introducing new production technologies and/or tightening 
controls on production, that would also raise uncertainty of firm’s income streams. 
In addition, foreign ownership fosters improvements in firm-level corporate governance than 
would local investors (Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Better governance would also in turn 
positively impact firm’s risk-taking (John et al., 2008). Foreign investors in privatized firms 
also seek to enhance diversification through their international investments. This 
diversification would then most likely foster firm-risk and managerial risk-taking (i.e. firm’s 
risk-play) as evidenced in Faccio et al. (2011). Therefore, our fourth and fifth hypothesis is: 
 
H4: Higher promoter shareholdings influence firm’s risk-play. 
and 




Fundamental valuation drivers and firm’s risk-play: 
 
Firms typically have heterogeneous alternative investment opportunities. Hence, corporate 
governance’s and shareholding identity/pattern’s impact on firm-risk and managerial risk- 
taking would not be the same for all firms. In fact, we argue that negative effect of a large board 
should be weaker for high-growth firms, but more severe for low-growth firms (see Nakano 
and Nguyen, 2012). Similarly, positive effect of foreign shareholding pattern should be 
comparatively less strong in a high-growth firm than a low-growth peer has. As a result, a high- 
growth firm would exhibit a higher market value (so price-to-book value would also be higher) 
together with a high-risk profile. This implication fits well with findings from Coles et al. 
(2008) that larger boards can add value in some circumstances even though their impact is 
considered typically negative (Yermack, 1996; Guest, 2009). In addition, a high-growth firm 
enjoys higher market share and mostly satisfies investors by higher dividend pay-outs. 
 
Field studies using survey data (e.g., Brav et al., 2004) provide compelling evidence that firm- 
risk can shape dividend policy. Venkatesh (1989) also argue that higher level of firm-risk 
causes a reduction in firm’s willingness to discharge cash through dividend payments. 
Therefore, in choosing dividend levels, managers strategize in a way to sustain future earnings 
with a high degree of certainty. This suggests that dividend payments should be inversely 
related to firm-risk and managerial risk-taking (i.e. firm’s risk-play). Myers and Majluf (1984) 
also contend that managers might also have to choose between dividend payments and capital 
expenditures (investments) which is also used here as a proxy of managerial risk-taking. 
Therefore, our sixth hypothesis is: 
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H6: Fundamental valuation drivers (high-growth, increasing market-size, low dividend-pay- 
outs and increasing P/BV) influence firm’s risk-play. 
 
Firm-characteristics drivers and firm’s risk-play: 
 
Empirical studies (see Fisher and Hall, 1969; Hurdle, 1974; Lant and Montgomery, 1987; 
Lehner, 2000; Coles et al., 2008; Guest, 2009; John et al., 2008; Acharya et al., 2011; Aebi et 
al., 2012; Nakano and Nguyen, 2012; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Li et al., 2013; etc.) show 
that firm’s characteristics act as catalysts to main conclusions drawn. In this context, Hermalin 
and Weisbach (2003) argue that risky external environment can shape firms risk-taking based 
on its heterogeneous characteristics. Here, we have incorporated impact of external 
environment by industry performance variable under psychological drivers. 
 
We have also incorporated age, size, leverage and liquidity to proxy the impact of individual 
firm’s heterogeneous characteristics on its risk-play. Age is the basic firm-characteristics which 
impacts firm-risk and managerial risk-taking through the indirect route of ‘market power’ or 
market size (is taken as a fundamental valuation driver here) in terms of its size, liquidity and 
leverage. If ‘market power’ is assumed to have an impact on firm’s risk-play, and as it is only 
logical to assume older firms which has survived for some length of time and large firms which 
has size to play with, do have higher ‘market power’, then older and large firms would exhibit 
evidence of lower risk (see Venkatesh, 1989). Pecking order theory (Myers, 1984) and Ferreira 
and Vilela’s (2004) free cash flow hypothesis prove this theoretically. However, this 
contradicts with the liquidity perspective, i.e., large firms hold less cash due to their greater 
access to capital markets (see Subramaniam et al., 2011) because of their strong information 
symmetry and thereby vulnerable to risk (see Opler et al., 1999; and Subramaniam et al., 2011). 
On the other hand, expectation is that small firms would hold relatively more cash to avoid 
financial distress/failures. This implies a risk-seeking attitude for large firms and an opposite 
approach by their small counterparts. Opler et al. (1999) also find that firms with strong growth 
opportunities (also a fundamental valuation driver here) hold more cash. Hannan and Freeman 
(1984) and Nelson and Winter (1982) also point out that with increasing firm’s age, CEOs feel 
more comfortable about following established routines and limit innovative search behaviors 
(Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006). Therefore, overall, we argue that old firms take lower risks than 
their younger counterparts do. Large organizations also normally have difficulty undertaking 
dramatic changes (Aldrich, 1979), as they are more likely to have established routines and 
hierarchical structures (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Therefore, overall, we also argue that small 
firms are more risk seeking than large organisations. 
 
Firms also can use borrowing as a substitute for holding cash (i.e. liquidity) because leverage 
can act as a proxy for the ability of firms to issue debt (John, 1993). This implies higher risk- 
taking by firms and managers. Baskin (1987) argues that cost of funds used to invest in liquidity 
increases as the ratio of debt financing increases, which would imply a reduction in cash 
holdings with increased debt in capital structure. Thus, in both ways it shows risk-seeking 
attitude of these firms. Therefore, Opler et al. (1999) and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) predict that 
there is a negative relation between firm’s cash holdings and its leverage in line with the 
pecking order theory (Myers, 1984) and the free cash flow hypothesis (Ferreira and Vilela, 
2004). Venkatesh (1989) also puts that simple financial analysis can demonstrate a positive 
relation between financial and operating leverage and firm-risk. Firms with more resources (i.e. 
slack) tend to have more leeway to indulge in exploratory activities (Cyert and March, 1963), 
allowing their CEOs more discretion (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987). Therefore, we also 
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argue that excess liquidity increases managerial risk-taking and firm-risk (i.e. firm’s risk-play). 
Therefore, our seventh and final hypothesis is: 
 
Firm-characteristics [age (young), size (small), liquidity (low and high both) and leverage 
(high) say positively] influence firm’s risk-play. 
 




We start with CNX NIFTY 500 firm’s data collected from Centre for Monitoring Indian 
Economy’s (CMIE) prowess database. Nevertheless, data are available for approximately 379 
firms for all study years starting from 1999 up to 2017. However, we exclude financial services 
companies (including banks and NBFCs) for this study because of their normal prohibition in 
financial literature. Thereby, finally we investigate 269 firms comprising of 5,111 firm years 
for all 23 variables. This is in line with the requirements of the SEM as sample size is 




Table 1 explains the variables (under different constructs) used in this study. 
 
 
Table 1: Description of variables 
 
This table explains the dependent and independent variables (under different constructs) undertaken in this 
study. The firm-risk (FR) is proxied by income stream risk and accounting beta risk and managerial risk-taking 
(MR) is represented by capital intensity ratio and market risk. These are all dependent variables of this study. 
The 19 independent variables (drivers/antecedents) as constructed here are classified into 7 broad heads 


























Ex-post standard deviation () of individual firm’s actual return on assets (ROA) for 
preceding 5 years in year t 
 
[(Firm’s actual ROA in year t – Mean ROA of the firm for all years)×(Actual ROA mean 
for all firms in year t – Actual ROA mean for all firms [representing CNX NIFTY 500 
Index here] for all years)]× (Actual ROA mean for all firms in year t – Actual ROA mean 
for all firms [representing CNX NIFTY 500 Index here] for all years)2 
[(Average total assets/Sales)*100] in year t [average total assets = (total assets in year 
t-1 + total assets in year t)/2] 
 
(Annualised monthly market return of a firm in year t-1 – Annualised monthly market 
return of the benchmark index [CNX NIFTY 500 Index here] in year t-1) 
Actual ROA [(PAT/Average total assets)*100] in year t 
 
 
Annualised monthly market return {[((1 + R)^12) - 1] x 100} of a firm in year t 
 
 
[(OCF/Average total assets)*100] in year t [average total assets = (total assets in year t- 
1 + total assets in year t)/2] 
 
ASPt = ([ROAt-1 – ASPt-1 (i.e. ROAt-2)] + ROAt-1) 
 
Expectation EXPt = ([PEt-1 – EXPt-1 (i.e. PEt-2)] + PEt-1) 
 








































[Firm’s actual ROA in year t (ROAt) - Mean ROA for all firms in a similar industry in 
year t-1 (IndROAt-1)] 
 
Logn number of directors in the board in year t 
 
% of independent directors to total number of directors in the board in year t 
 
 
% of shareholdings by the promoter(s) in year t 
 
 
% of shareholdings by the foreign promoter(s) in year t 
 
 
% of shareholdings by the non-promoter FIIs in year t 
 
 
Logn net sales amount in year t 
 
% change in investment in total assets in year t from year t-1 (i.e.TAt = [{(TAt -TAt- 
1)/TAt-1}*100]) 
 
[(Equity dividend/PAT)*100] in year t 
 
Market capitalisation in year t/Book value of assets in year t (scaled in average) 
 
Logn (Year t – Year of incorporation of the firm) 
 
Logn average total assets in year t [average total assets = (total assets in year t-1 + total 
assets in year t)/2] 
Debt/Average total assets in year t [average total assets = (total assets in year t-1 + total 
assets in year t)/2] 
Logn average [{opening balance + closing balance}/2] of cash balance and short-term 
investments (i.e. cash and cash equivalents) in year t 
 
Note 1: All market return calculations are undertaken on adjusted closing price basis. 
Note 2: All absolute amount figures have been log normalised. 
Note 3: PD – Performance drivers; PSYD – Psychological drivers; CGD – Corporate governance drivers; 
SHPD1 & 2 – Shareholdings pattern drivers 1 & 2; FVD – Fundamental valuation drivers; FCD – Firm 
characteristics drivers. 
Note 3: PAT – Profit after tax; OCF – Operating cash flow; ASPt - Aspiration in year t; EXPt - Expectation in 





The unpredictability in a firm’s income stream is a result of its risk and managerial risk-taking 
behaviour (Bromiley, 1991). Therefore, we measure firm’s risk from the income stream 
variability and market-adjusted return variability (i.e. through accounting β) viewpoints under 
this study. We also incorporate managerial problematic and innovative searches (risk-taking) 
by market risk and capital intensity risk proxies. 
In the first case, firm-risk (henceforth ) is measured as ex-post standard deviation of individual 
firm’s actual return on assets (i.e. ROA) for preceding 5 years on a rolling basis, i.e., 






t-1 (ROAj – ROA)2 
(ROA)t =        (1) 
j=t-5 n - 1 
 
 
Where, t = 2004, 2005,……., 2017 
 
 
We also introduce here accounting beta to proxy firm-risk to surrogate the degree of co- 
variability of a firm’s earnings and earnings of the market (i.e. other firms) (see Elgers, 1980). 
This is a non-market measure of systematic risk and economy-wide factors duly affects it, as 
opposed to unsystematic component that relates to other firm-specific factors. We calculate this 
in line with Bowman (1979) (see table 1). Therefore, by taking market-adjusted accounting beta 
along with firm-specific income stream risk, we make our study more robust. 
 
We also measure managerial risk-taking by incorporating a market risk variable which we 
calculate as stock market-adjusted stock return by taking the difference between firm’s monthly 
stock return and monthly return on the value-weighted market index (i.e. CNX NIFTY 500 
Index) (see table 1). This surrogates the risk the managers are taking to improve their stock 
performance (to make investors happy). Second measure used here to proxy managerial risk- 
taking is capital intensity ratio (see table 1). It increases managerial risk-taking in two ways 
(Shapiro and Titman, 1986). If capital inputs are less variable than labour inputs in short-run, 
managers of a firm choosing to produce a given output with large amounts of capital and low 
amounts of labour increases its fixed costs and lowers its variable costs. The firm consequently 
would experience larger variations in profits/income if demand fluctuates. Additionally, 
managers using large amounts of capital (innovative searches) run a high risk of capital 
obsolescence - the possibility that technological change would make its capital investment 
worth little or nothing. Here, we calculate capital intensity risk as ratio of total assets to sales 
in line with Miller and Bromiley (1991). 
 
We discuss the independent constructs (see table 1) in detail while formulating hypotheses in 
the previous section. 
 
Methodology 
We have used Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) because the different constructs used in 
the study are latent constructs (e.g., performance drivers, psychological drivers, corporate 
governance drivers, shareholding pattern, etc.). This technique has the capacity to combine 
empirical observations with relations among unobserved constructs into a single integrated 
system. We have the following research questions like - do the performance drivers have any 
effect on firms’ risk play? How does the different psychological drivers affect the firms’ risk 
play? Is there any effect of corporate governance drivers on firms’ risk play? etc. To answer 
these questions, we need a unified model provided by SEM to investigate the relationships 
among multiple dependent and independent variables. 
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Another reason for SEM to be the preferred model here compared to methods of conventional 
multiple regressions is that SEM's typically disjointed nature to generate separate and 
individually distinct coefficients. The SEM technique permits checking and examining a 
complete model by generating goodness-of-fit statistics and assessing the overall fit (Gefen et 
al., 2011; Ho and Shieh, 2006). 
 
Accordingly, we employ the SEM to test unidimensionality of the constructs and to analyze 
the drivers (i.e. antecedents) of firm-risk and managerial risk-taking. We use the SEM here 
because of its several privileges over other approaches (see e.g. Gefen et al., 2011; and Byrne, 
2010). 
 
We analyze the scales after collection of data to test purification, reliability, unidimensionality 
and validity of them. Purification is done using Corrected Item Total Correlation (CITC), 
reliability is tested using Cronbach’s Alpha while validity and unidimensionality are tested 
using PLS Path Modeling. Under purification, we delete variables showing scores lower than 
0.5 with respect to constructs to which it belongs, unless there is a compelling reason to keep 
them in the respective constructs. We verify the convergent validity or unidimensionality of 
each construct, modelled in the reflective mode, by examining their AVE values. Generally, 
constructs which have AVE greater than 0.50 and composite reliability greater than 0.70, are 
considered to have a good convergent validity (Chin, 1998). We ascertain the discriminant 
validity of constructs by comparing the AVE scores of the two constructs, with the square of 
the correlation between the two constructs. If both AVE values are larger than the square of the 
correlation, we consider constructs to show discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). 
 
We also check the multivariate normality of all the variables used here by Shapiro-Wilks (S- 
W) test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test as well as by skewness and kurtosis. We also test 
the linear relationship by Box M test value (i.e. 270.61) with a p-value is 0.056. We use 
Mahalanobis D-square and find that our dataset is free from outlier. The value of D2/df comes 
out to be 3.05 for all the items under different constructs. We test one-way causality through 
Granger’s (1969) test pre-modelling and find the observed covariance to be true. Therefore, 





















3 We do not include all results here for the sake of brevity. 




Descriptive statistics results 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics results 
 
This table provides mean, standard deviation, maximum and minimum values of 269 Indian firms studied here 
(see table 1 for description of these variables). 
Variables Mean SD  Maximum Minimum 
(ROA) (%) 0.41  2.72 23.01 0.41 
Acct. β -4.74  3.15 29.08 -4.74 
Capital intensity ratio (%) 0.01  8.83 127.36 0.01 
Market risk (%) -6.33  2.49 13.05 -6.33 
ROA (%) -6.87  6.02 34.21 -6.87 
Market return (%) -2.7  3.15 31.12 -2.7 
Cash return (%) 0.02  14.16 165.99 0.02 
Aspiration (%) -6.77  6.12 34.48 -6.77 
Expectation (%) -0.6  21.92 359.69 -0.6 
Industry performance (%) -19.61  5.15 18.60 -19.61 
Board size (logn) 0.56  0.11 1.33 0.56 
Board independence (%) 0.01  9.82 65.76 0.01 
Promoters holdings (%) 16.86  15.89 96.65 16.86 
Foreign promoters holdings (%) 0.01  23.39 85.83 0.01 
Non-promoter FIIs holdings (%) 0.02  7.90 38.91 0.02 
Net sales (logn) 0.01  0.66 6.48 0.01 
% change in TA -5.16  16.29 197.85 -5.16 
Dividend pay-outs (%) 0.01  36.06 490.00 0.01 
P-to-BV -1.3  3.91 34.83 -1.3 
Age (logn) 1.26  0.20 2.19 1.26 
Average TA (logn) 3  0.66 6.46 3 
Debt/TA (%) 0.01  17.43 87.01 0.01 
Average cash & CE (logn) -0.79  1.21 5.25 -0.79 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics results of the variables undertaken in this study. Results 
show that cash performance, expectation (i.e. PE multiples), promoters and foreign promoters 
holdings, growth opportunities (based on TA), dividend pay-outs and leverage of Indian firms 
are highly volatile which implies riskiness of these firms in wider contexts. This substantiates 





Table 3 indicates the co-relationships among the studied variables. It is evident that operating 
performance, aspirations, industry performance, growth opportunities and price-to-book value 
significantly positively influence firm-risk. On the other hand, managerial risk-taking has 
significant positive association with market returns, growth opportunities and leverage of the 
sample firms. Board’s size, board-independence, market size, age, size and leverage of a firm has 
significant negative association with income stream uncertainty and/or accounting beta, whereas 
aspiration, promoters’ shareholdings, price-to-book value, age, size, liquidity of the firm has 
significant negative impact on market risk and capital intensity risk proxies. Results also support 
interrelationships in between variables, which formulate different constructs here. All these 
results further substantiate our investigation objectives under this study.     
 




Table 3: Correlations results 
 
This table presents the correlations results among the studied variables. Here, ISR stands for income stream risk, ACC indicates accounting
stands for capital intensity ratio, ROA means return on assets, MRE implies market return, CP denotes cash performance, ASP stands for aspiration, EXP implies expectation,
INDP indicates industry performance, BS represents board size, BI stands for board independence, PSH means promoters shareholdings, FPSH implies foreign promoters
shareholdings, NPFIIs indicates non-promoter FIIs holdings, MS implies market size, GO stands for growth opportunities, DPR represents dividend pay
price-to-book value, AGE indicates age of the firm, SIZE implies size of the firm, LEV represents leverage of the firm, LIQ stands for liquidity







                
MR .003 -.100* 1                
CIR .127** -.002 -.137** 1               
ROA .205*** .071 -.074 -.092 1              
MRE .003 -.100* 0.086*** -.137** -.074 1             
CP .010 -.013 -.009 -.014 -.015 -.009 1            
ASP .191*** .063 -.064  .791*** -.064 - 1           
    -.100*   .015            
EXP -.002 .073 .008 .098 .007 .008 - .008 1          
       .007            
INDP .120**  -.085 -.028 .668*** -.085 - .659*** .078 1         
  .109*     .008            
BS -.281*** .195*** -.064 .027 -.028 -.064 .008 -.024 .123** -.004 1        
BI -.029 - 
.163*** 




1       










.028 .177*** -.054 - 
.389*** 
1      
FPSH .026 .034 -.033 -.077 .168*** -.033 - 
.050 
.164*** .019 .155** -.080 - 
.365*** 
.226*** 1     
NPFIIs -.076 .080 .043 .022 .137** .043 - 
.032 
.127** .065  
.114* 




1    
MS - 
.246*** 
.241*** -.075 - 
.162*** 
.013 -.075 .021 .021  
.118* 
.055 .538***  
-.127** 
-.013 -.067 .300*** 1   















DPR -.004 .080 -.034 -.023 .069 -.034 - .063 -.044 .070 .038 .006 -.032 .078 .051 .017  
       .051          -.106*  
P/BV .162*** -.081  
-.133** 














-.062 -.077  
-.105* 












-.091 .130** -.031 .477*** -.092 .032  
-.131** 
.265*** .670*** -.039 -.013
LEV -.082  .133** .054 - .133** - - -.009 - -.057 .237***  - -.032 .025 .045 -.064
  -.103*   .577***  .008 .566***  .515***   -.100* .380***     
LIQ -.031 .145**  
-.138** 




.267*** .070 .264*** .339*** .036 -.007  
-.137** 
.254*** .463*** .019 -.003
*** Accepted at 1% level of significance; ** Accepted at 5% level of significance; * Accepted at 10% level of significance. 
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Reliability and validity of measures results 
 
Table 4: Standardized loadings and composite reliability (confirmatory factor analysis [CFA]) 
 
This table provides results of standardised loadings, composite reliability and the average variance extracted under the 
CFA of the constructs and variables formulating these constructs. 
Constructs and indicators Standardized 
loadings 
t-value Composite reliability Variance extracted 
Performance drivers (PD)   0.82 0.54 
Operating performance 
(ROA) 
0.781 3.44   
Market performance 0.713 4.13   
Cash performance 0.881 4.66   
Psychological drivers 
(PSYD) 
  0.76 0.59 
Aspiration 0.776 5.77   
Expectation 0.811 6.57   
Industry performance 0.791 9.11   
Corporate governance 
drivers (CGD) 
  0.78 0.51 
Board size 0.703 9.08   
Board independence 0.772 1.99   
Shareholding pattern 
drivers (1) (SHPD1) 
  0.80 0.61 
Promoter holdings 0.720 9.01   
Shareholding pattern 
drivers (2) (SHPD2) 
  0.72 0.64 
Foreign promoter holdings 0.710 12.34   
Non-promoter FIIs holdings 0.709 23.11   
Fundamental valuation 
drivers (FVD) 
  0.89 0.52 
Market size 0.779 12.65   
Growth opportunities 0.761 13.44   
Dividend pay-out 0.703 18.11   
P/BV 0.778 12.13   
Firm characteristics 
drivers (FCD) 
  0.78 0.61 
Age  0.704 11.56   
Size  0.761 10.32   
Leverage  0.776 11.65   
Liquidity 0.773 10.44   
Firm-Risk (FR)   0.82 0.56 
Income Stream Risk 0.771 7.88   
Accounting Beta Risk 0.701 9.76   
Managerial Risk-taking 
(MR) 
  0.77 0.60 
Capital Intensity Risk 0.770 10.98   
Market Risk 0.810 11.11   
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Table 4: Standardized loadings and composite reliability (confirmatory factor analysis [CFA]) 
 
This table provides results of standardised loadings, composite reliability and the average variance extracted under the 
CFA of the constructs and variables formulating these constructs. 
Constructs and indicators Standardized 
loadings 
t-value Composite reliability Variance extracted 
Performance drivers (PD)   0.82 0.54 
Operating performance 
(ROA) 
0.781 3.44   
Market performance 0.713 4.13   
Cash performance 0.881 4.66   
Psychological drivers 
(PSYD) 
  0.76 0.59 
Aspiration 0.776 5.77   
Expectation 0.811 6.57   
Industry performance 0.791 9.11   
Corporate governance 
drivers (CGD) 
  0.78 0.51 
Board size 0.703 9.08   
Board independence 0.772 1.99   
Shareholding pattern 
drivers (1) (SHPD1) 
  0.80 0.61 
Promoter holdings 0.720 9.01   
Shareholding pattern 
drivers (2) (SHPD2) 
  0.72 0.64 
Foreign promoter holdings 0.710 12.34   
Non-promoter FIIs holdings 0.709 23.11   
Fundamental valuation 
drivers (FVD) 
  0.89 0.52 
Market size 0.779 12.65   
Growth opportunities 0.761 13.44   
Dividend pay-out 0.703 18.11   
P/BV 0.778 12.13   
Firm characteristics 
drivers (FCD) 
  0.78 0.61 
Age  0.704 11.56   
Size  0.761 10.32   
Leverage  0.776 11.65   
Liquidity 0.773 10.44   
Firm-Risk (FR)   0.82 0.56 
Income Stream Risk 0.771 7.88   
Accounting Beta Risk 0.701 9.76   
Managerial Risk-taking 
(MR) 
  0.77 0.60 
Capital Intensity Risk 0.770 10.98   
Market Risk 0.810 11.11   
Notes:df= 2.03, p-value<0.005, RMSEA = 0.020, GFI = 0.812, CFI =0.831, NFI=0.821. 
 
We have used AMOS 20 for the SEM here. In the first stage of data analysis, our first objective 
is to measure the convergent validity of nine different constructs taken here, and, how they are 
distinct from each other (i.e. discriminant validity). Therefore, we conduct a confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) based on 23 variables to check fitness of measurement model having 9 
constructs of the theoretical model given in Fig.1. Tables 4 and 5 are showing results of CFA. 
For our measurement model, values of different indices with (2/df) value of 2.03 (p <0.005), 
RMSEA<0.05; CFI=0.831, GFI= 0.812 and NFI=0.821. Thus, it represents a good model fit 
and all are acceptable (i.e. hypotheses results). 
 
We examine the convergent validity by looking at each item loadings and the AVE. From table 




4, it is evident that factor loadings for each construct are highly significant (p< 0.05, t> 1.96) 
(see Anderson and Gerbing, 1988) and their values are ranging from 0.6 to 0.8, which signifies 
convergent validity of the constructs. Value of composite reliability exceeds minimum value 




Table 5: Discriminant validity measurement 
 
This table provides results of discriminant validity (DV) as we find average variance extracted (AVE) for each 
pair of variables is greater than the squared correlation for the same pair, which implies that each construct is 
distinct. It also incorporates mean and SD of the constructs. Here PD stands for performance drivers; PSYD 
represents psychological drivers; CGD implies corporate governance drivers; SHPD1 & 2 stands for 
shareholdings pattern drivers 1 & 2; FVD represents fundamental valuation drivers; and FCD stands for firm 
characteristics drivers. Also, FR stands for firm-risk and MR represents managerial risk-taking. 
Test for 
DV 
PD PSYD CGD SHPD1 SHPD2 FVD FCD FR MR 
PD 1         
PSYD 0.489 1        
CGD 0.411 0.401 1       
SHPD1 0.541 0.511 0.501 1      
SHPD2 0.243 0.324 0.344 0.301 1     
FVD 0.441 0.541 0.501 0.411 0.551 1    
FCD 0.324 0.432 0.431 0.512 0.311 0.551 1   
FR 0.442 0.334 0.331 0.341 0.331 0.501 0.500 1  
MR 0.446 0.405 0.412 0.422 0.451 0.445 0.405 0.431 1 
MEAN 5.50 5.13 5.19 5.46 5.55 5.61 5.05 5.88 5.67 
SD 1.09 0.93 1.12 1.15 1.08 1.16 1.12 1.13 0.97 
 
 
Table 5 shows the discriminant validity in which the squared correlation between the constructs 
is less than the AVE for each pair of constructs (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). This implies that 
each construct is distinct. The inter-correlation among the nine constructs are also significant 
(p<0.05). 
 








Table 6: Hypotheses testing results 
 
This table summarizes the hypotheses testing results based on t-value and significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels. 
Here PD stands for performance drivers; PSYD represents psychological drivers; CGD implies corporate 
governance drivers; SHPD1 & 2 stands for shareholdings pattern drivers 1 & 2; FVD represents fundamental 
valuation drivers; and FCD stands for firm characteristics drivers. Also, FR stands for firm-risk and MR 
represents managerial risk-taking. 
Hypotheses Critical value (t-value) Decision (accept/reject) 
H1: PD FR 11.32** Accept 
PD MR 9.11*** Accept 
H2: PSYD FR 2.11* Accept 
PSYD MR 1.46 Reject 
H3: CGD FR 12.11** Accept 
CGD MR 12.23** Accept 
H4: SHPD1 FR 21.56** Accept 
SHPD1 MR 5.60** Accept 
H5: SHPD2 FR 3.12*** Accept 
SHPD2 MR 1.22 Reject 
H6: FVD FR 0.44 Reject 
FVD MR 0.96 Reject 
H7: FCD FR 12.54** Accept 
FCD MR 2.11* Accept 
*** Accepted at 1% level of significance; ** Accepted at 5% level of significance; * Accepted at 10% 
level of significance. 
 
 
It is proposed in this study that performance drivers influence firm-risk and managerial risk- 
taking (H1). According to the results, the critical values (t-values) are11.32 at p<0.05 and 9.11 
at p<0.01, hence our findings are significant in nature. It implies that firm’s operating 
performance, market performance and cash performance all are significantly influencing its 
risk and managerial attitudes towards problematic and innovative searches. Results prove that 
psychological drivers (H2) i.e. aspirations, expectations and industry performance are only 
significantly impacting income stream risk and operating performance’s systematic risk (i.e. 
accounting β) (t-value of 2.11 at p<0.10), but doesn’t influence managerial risk-taking in the 
broader context. So, hypothesis 2 is only partially accepted. Board’s size and its independent 
nature (H3) i.e. corporate governance drivers are also significantly influencing both firm-risk 
and managerial risk-taking with critical values of 12.11 and 12.23 (at p<0.05). Table 6 results 
also show that hypothesis 4 (H4) is accepted as t-values of 21.56 and 5.60 are significant at 5% 
level. Therefore, promoters’ shareholdings volume influence managerial propensity to take 
risks and thereby the variability of income and systematic risk in relation to industry peers. 
However, it is found that foreign promoters and non-promoter FIIs holdings only influence 
firm-risk and not managerial risk-taking. This is due to the fact that hypothesis 5 (H5) is only 
partially accepted with critical values (t-values) of 3.12 (at p<0.10) and 1.22 (at p>0.10). Table 
6 results do not show any impact of market size, growth opportunities, dividend pay-outs and 
P/BV (i.e. fundamental valuation drivers) on firm’s risk-play. Hypothesis 6 (H6) is rejected 
under both cases with t-values of 0.44 and 0.96 (at p>0.10). However, interestingly, firm’s 
characteristics drivers (age, size, leverage and liquidity) have a significant impact on firm-risk 
and managerial risk-taking. This is evident by the significant t-values of 12.54 (at p<0.05) and 




In this study, we find impact of performance (irrespective of operating, market and cash) on 
income stream variability (i.e. SD of past performance) and systematic deviation in firm’s 
operating performance (i.e. accounting beta) from the overall context for all Indian firms in a 




top-down basis. This adds value to the empirical literature (Bowman, 1980; 1984; Fiegenbaum 
and Thomas, 1985; 1988; etc.) which only examine the issue in a troubled-firms context. Our 
results significantly and from different angles (as we have also taken the stock market 
performance and cash performance along with firm’s ROA [limitation in erstwhile literature]) 
prove our hypothesis that performance drivers critically influence firm’s risk. Additionally, our 
results show that managerial propensity to searches (both problematic and innovative) in 
relation to firm’s stock performance (market risk proxy) in comparison to overall markets to 
attract investors and searches via improving capital intensity ratio both are impacted by firm’s 
performance. 
 
We could not prove our initial observation that aspiration-expectancy gap for all firms in terms 
of their actual performance (ROA here), market performance and industry-adjusted 
performance would induce managers to resort to innovative searches. However, these drivers 
influence firm-risk by making operating performance volatile and increasing systematic 
deviation from the industry-leaders i.e. sound Indian firms. We may also confer that, as age- 
old empirical literature (see Cyert and March, 1963; and March and Shapira, 1987 [behavioural 
theory]; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 [prospect theory]) points out that managers of poor 
firms (below target or reference returns level) would be more risk-seeking than their superior 
counterparts, hold true in Indian context (in line with Lant and Montgomery, 1987). Although 
we prove that all psychological drivers used here are relevant to influence firm-risk. 
One of the most critical findings of our study is impact of corporate governance drivers (board- 
size and -independence) on both firm-risk and managerial risk-taking at the same time in an 
emerging market context [like Wang (2012) in a developed market context]. Empirical 
literature occasionally document Board-size’s negative influence on managerial risk-taking 
(see Sah and Stiglitz, 1986; 1991) and positive influence on performance volatility (see Cheng, 
2008) across developed markets. However, our study results significantly and overwhelmingly 
prove influence of board size on both firm-risk and managerial risk-taking in the same direction 
in an emerging market context i.e. India. We also prove the impact of board-independence as 
a CGD in influencing organisational risk and innovative searches by Indian managers (thereby 
contradicting with Aebi et al., 2012; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; and Pathan, 2009). 
 
Our results also show that promoters’ shareholdings directly influence firm’s risk-play. This is 
because promoters-shareholders do initiate risks to cater performance and growth for firms 
(Bromiley, 1991; John et al., 2008). However, results show that foreign promoters and non- 
promoter foreign holdings (FIIs) only influence income stream variability and systematic risk 
of operating performance, and not innovative searches by managers. Therefore, it is evident 
that our results do not substantiate overall results of John et al. (2008) and Faccio et al. (2011). 
Results here also prove that fundamental valuation drivers i.e. market size, growth 
opportunities, dividend pay-outs and P/BV of Indian firms has no role to play in influencing 
firm-risk and managerial risk-attitudes. So, unlike Myers and Majluf (1984), Yermack (1996), 
and Guest (2009) we could not find any counter-party influence of value and growth drivers of 
Indian firms on their risk-profiles and manager’s searches which itself is quite intriguing 
looking at other study results here. 
 
On the contrary, it is interesting to observe significant influence of firm’s characteristics drivers 
on an overall basis (i.e. age, size, leverage and liquidity) on both firm-risk and managerial risk- 
taking in line with Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), Lavie and Rosenkopf (2006), etc. This, 
however, contradicts with the mixed results of most of the erstwhile empirical studies including 
Myers (1984), Venkatesh (1989), Opler et al. (1999), Ferreira and Vilela (2004), Subramaniam 
et al. (2011), etc. So, we can comment in line with our presumed hypothesis that young firms, 




small firms in need of growth, explore innovative searches; high and low-liquidity and high- 
leverage firms explore both problematic and innovative searches; which in turn impacts income 
stream variability and generates higher systematic risks in operating performance for Indian 




Determinants and consequences of firm-risk are examined in the US and other developed 
markets worldwide (see e.g., Bargeron et al.,2010; Faccio et al., 2011; John et al., 2008; Li et 
al., 2013; etc.). However, empirical literature pays little attention to these issues in emerging 
markets contexts. In most of these studies firm-risk and managerial risk-taking are inaccurately 
used interchangeably although practically they should be distinguished. Also, scholarly 
research in strategy, finance and other organisation disciplines have generally focused on 
identifying factors that explain company performance without serious consideration of drivers 
(i.e. antecedents) of firm-risk and managerial risk-taking except in relation to systematic risk. 
We fill all these literature gaps by examining firm-risk (proxied by income stream risk and 
accounting beta) and managerial risk-taking (proxied by market risk and capital intensity ratio) 
under one model by the most advanced SEM to find out the antecedents of these for Indian 
firms i.e. in an emerging market context. 
 
Our results prove that present firm-performance, corporate governance, promoter’s 
shareholding and institutional characteristics are driving both firm-risk and managerial risk- 
taking. These findings contribute to the existing scant firm-risk and managerial risk-taking 
literature in regard to their antecedents in the emerging market contexts. We extend the 
importance of firm performance (see Massini et al., 2005; DasGupta and Deb, 2020; etc.); 
corporate governance (see Brick and Chidambaran, 2008; Bhagat et al., 2015; etc.); 
concentration of promoter’s shareholdings (Faccio et al., 2011; and Ferreira and Matos, 2008); 
and firms’ characteristics (see Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; John, 1993; Venkatesh, 1989; etc.) 
in driving firm’s overall risk-play i.e. both firm-risk and managerial risk-taking. However, 
fundamental valuation drivers have no role to play in influencing income-variability, 
systematic operating risks and managerial risk-attitudes. Psychological drivers and foreign 
shareholdings act only as a catalyst of firm-risk. The distinctness of our dependent variables 
and vastness of our independent constructs has made this study more robust. 
Future studies can examine the model tested here in a cross-country context and under different 
situations and market cycles. The external environmental impact like economic, political, 
regulatory, etc. influence firm-risk and managerial risk-taking combinedly can also add value 
to this study results. 
 
Our results would be of immense help to firm-insiders (managers and promoters), analysts and 
investment consultants, market regulators and other firm-stakeholders who take active interest 
in Indian firms or emerging countries firms. This is as all these stakeholders take active interest 
in firm-specific associated risks especially in the current era of promoters’ pledged securities, 
financial distress and fall-outs by Indian companies, etc. Our results clearly document the 
firm’s internals that they can assess and/or look into to take their distinctive decisions in 
different contexts. Study results can also promulgate future researchers to examine the 
proposed model in other emerging countries or in cross-country contexts. 
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